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Abstract: A. C. Littleton [1933, pp. 149-151] in Accounting Evolution
to 1900 wrote that the sub-division of financial statements and the
valuation of assets were two of the most important elements in the
development of modern financial statements. The purpose of this
paper is to explore the historical evolution of the recognition, group-
ing, and valuation of current assets on the balance sheet in the
United States between 1865 and 1940 at which time the basic for-
mat for reporting such assets had been adopted. The paper expands
the examination of the balance sheet beyond a traditional emphasis
on long-life assets to an investigation of the evolving classification of
current assets with a special emphasis on the influence of financial
users (especially creditors) for its unique development. Historical
illustrations of the ways in which companies presented and valued
current assets on the balance sheet are presented.
In matters of form the greatest change which later
statements showed was the grouping of data into sub-
sections [A. C. Littleton, 1933, p. 149].
INTRODUCTION
In 1913, Charles Sprague [1913, p. 26] wrote that “the bal-
ance sheet may be considered as the groundwork of all accoun-
tancy, the origin and the terminus of every account”. At that
time, however, some companies still issued annual reports that
did not include balance sheets or, if balance sheets were in-
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cluded, the financial information was often minimal. Addition-
ally, at the beginning of the 20th century most companies did
not classify balance sheets, and in the statements of the few
companies that did, there was no consistency in the grouping of
items.
Moreover, neither the order of liquidity nor market or net
realizable values were determined for assets such as accounts
(bills) receivables or inventories. In fact, Foulke [1968, p. 189]
notes that it was after 1900 that public accounting firms com-
monly used the terms ‘current assets’ and ‘current liabilities’.
Yet, as Foulke [1945, p. 70] writes: “The classification of cur-
rent assets is undoubtedly the most important classification in
a balance sheet, as current assets largely determine the going
solvency of a business concern.” This lack of classification also
affected credit analysis as pointed out by Brown [1955, p. 18] in
her dissertation on the history of ratio analysis: “For years the
financial statements published by banks were not adequate for
extensive analysis because of a lack of significant classification
and clarity of expression.” Although her statement concerned
banks, the inability to conduct meaningful financial statement
analysis was equally true for other industries.
Despite the lack of significant balance sheet classifications
at the beginning of the century, by 1940 the basic format for
reporting current assets on the balance sheet had been adopted.
Instead of following British precedent established under the
Companies Acts, the American (or Continental Europe) balance
sheet had its own characteristics, especially in regard to the
classification and position of current assets. Although many of
these characteristics developed after the start of the 20th cen-
tury, antecedents of these changes began shortly after the end
of the U. S. Civil War and reflect the evolution of the business
environment itself.
Immediately after the Civil War there was little need for
classified balance sheets. By 1940, it was impossible not to have
them. During that period, the business world evolved from one
that consisted primarily of sole proprietorships with little need
for financial statements to one consisting of larger businesses
that had to provide basic financial statements to their creditors.
The American business world then evolved towards larger
corporations that had to provide financial information to
shareholders, analysts, creditors, and various governmental en-
tities. This paper examines how the economic, legal and social
forces that contributed to the reorganization of the American
business world also contributed to the recognition, grouping,
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and valuation of current assets on the balance sheet and ex-
plores how these forces created the unique needs of the Ameri-
can business system which led to the development of financial
statements different from those developed in Britain.
Several accounting historians have investigated the evolu-
tion of financial statements into their present form. However,
most studies have concentrated on the overall development of
financial statements or upon the presentation and valuation of
long-term assets on the balance sheet rather than current items.
Examples of these investigations are numerous. Claire [1945]
examined the evolution of the annual report of United States
Steel Corporation (USS) from 1902 to 1943 while Schiff [1978]
contrasted the 1902 and 1974 annual reports of that corpora-
tion. Vangermeersch [1970, 1971/72, 1986] also examined fi-
nancial reporting milestones in the annual reports of USS over
seven decades as well as USS’s depreciation policies. Reed
[1989] contrasted the historical depreciation reporting practices
of USS with replacement cost estimates for 1939 and 1987. In
Financial Reporting Techniques in 20 Industrial Companies
Since 1861, Vangermeersch [1979] continued his analysis of an-
nual reports. Here, Vangermeersch examined the financial re-
porting techniques of companies such as General Electric and
Pullman & Company in regard to 63 aspects of reporting in
eight major topical areas such as balance sheets, income state-
ments, depreciation, and inventory. Through these studies,
Vangermeersch examined in depth the changing role and for-
mat of the balance sheet over the years. However, these studies
concentrated primarily on the changing balance sheet itself in-
stead of changing classifications on the balance sheet such as
current assets. Edwards [1984] in Studies of Company Records
1830-1974, presented a historical discussion on the develop-
ment of financial statements. In Corporate Financial Reporting
and Analysis in the Early 1900s Brief [1986] presented the early
annual reports of companies such as International Harvester
Company and American Telephone & Telegraph Company as
well as a series of historical comments on those reports. In an
article the following year, Brief [1987] further discussed the
financial reports of leading companies at the turn of the 20th
century. Recently, Previts and Samson [2000] examined the
annual reports of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad for the
period, 1827-1856. In addition, there have been two major con-
ceptual studies on working capital and solvency. In his disserta-
tion, Huizingh [1967, p. vii] examined the genesis and develop-
ment of the working capital concept (especially through the
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expressions of academic/financial writers) and proposed a new
structure for its presentation. In the AICPA’s Accounting Re-
search Monograph 3 (Financial Reporting and the Evaluation of
Solvency), Heath [1978], presented an extensive discussion of
the concept of solvency, the principles of balance sheet classifi-
cations, and problems incurred in defining current assets.
This paper expands the examination of the balance sheet
beyond the traditional emphasis on long-life assets to an inves-
tigation of how the classification of current assets on the bal-
ance sheet evolved from the end of the Civil War in 1865 to
1940 by which time the basic format had been adopted for the
reporting and valuation of current assets. A special emphasis is
placed on the influence of financial users (especially creditors)
in this development process. As Anton [1962, p. 5] writes: “the
great historical influence of bankers on financial statements
cannot be overemphasized . . . preparation of statements for the
granting of credit influenced not only the statements them-
selves but accounting principles as well.”
The end of the Civil War is used as the beginning point for
this investigation because at that time the major factors that led
to the increased importance of the balance sheet and the ulti-
mate need for the classification of current assets emerged. For
example, Huizingh [1967, p. 62] writes that it was soon after
the Civil War that the practice of purchase on open account
developed; Horrigan [1968, p. 285] states that it was in the
1870’s that “commercial banks began to request financial
statements for lending purposes”; and Foulke [1945, p. 618]
stated that “efforts were made by The Mercantile Agency in the
1870’s . . . to obtain balance sheets, which at that time were
better known as property statements [emphasis in original], for
the use of the mercantile and bank creditors.” Littleton and
Zimmerman [1962, p. 92] note that it was during this period
that bankers encouraged “utilizing short-term bank loans as a
source for much of the working capital needed by business.”
In order to address the development of current asset classi-
fication, the paper is divided into four periods: (a) 1865 to 1879,
(b) 1880 to 1899, (c) 1900 to 1920, and (d) 1921 to 1940. For
each period, a historical overview of the business environment
and the attitudes of management toward financial information
are discussed. The impact of the public accounting profession,
academic writings, judicial precedent, and statutory authority
on the reporting and valuation of current assets are also
reviewed. Additionally, historical illustrations of the ways in
which companies presented and valued current assets are
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presented.1  The final section presents the summary and conclu-
sions.
A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF INFORMATION, 1865-1879
Prior to and at the end of the Civil War, the great majority
of businesses were small proprietorships or partnerships that
had little need to prepare financial statements because the own-
ers personally knew the financial condition of their businesses.
Additionally, most businesses dealt directly with their suppliers
and, as Lough [1917, p. 113] stated, trade credit was the most
important form of credit where “purchases of merchandise
were customarily settled by notes running six, eight, or ten
months . . . which were readily indorsed [sic] and discounted.”
During the War and continuing afterwards, however, “mer-
chandise business came down to a basis of cash or of credit of
only ten to thirty days” [ibid]. This policy continued until the
early 1880s, when credit terms became somewhat longer but
“these terms were combined with offers of liberal discount for
cash payments” [Lough, 1917, p. 113]. Thus, as Lough [1917, p.
114] writes, with the end of the Civil War, “trade credit . . . is
relatively less important, and bank credit is more important.”
Although bank credit was now more important, a new
problem was created for the banks. Instead of discounting two-
party commercial notes, banks began to issue single-name
paper [Foulke 1945, p. 68] and, as Huizingh [1967, p. 62] points
out, “having foregone the security of double protection, they
sensed the need of obtaining more adequate and reliable finan-
cial information from their clients.” The reliable information
desired in most cases was the balance sheet, and on the balance
sheet, the liquidity of the assets became the major consider-
ation. Huizingh [1967, p. 62] writes: “His [banker’s] preference
was to obtain a statement indicating the probability that he
would be able to recoup his investment even though the busi-
ness were not to continue beyond the term of his loan.” With
the greater credit exposure, there was an increase in the impor-
tance of the mercantile credit agencies that had been estab-
lished before the Civil War and placed upon these agencies an
1In selecting illustrations, an effort was made to select companies respec-
tive of the major industries and to select companies with financial statements
illustrative of the various methods of presentation and valuation of current
assets on the balance sheet at that time.
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obligation to obtain “exact financial information as a trained
intermediary for creditors” [Foulke 1945, p. 68].
Although the great majority of businesses were not incor-
porated at the end of the Civil War the corporate form was
common in certain industries such as canals, railroads, banks,
and insurance. Incorporated during the first part of the 19th
century under special state charters and during the latter part
under general charters, these entities often were required by
their charters to issue some form of annual report. Often, how-
ever, the reports did not include balance sheets or profit or loss
statements. For example, the 28 page annual report of the
Union Canal Co. of Pennsylvania, 1865 contained an extensive
narrative of the company’s operations and offered great detail
about tonnage hauled and changes in cash balances. However,
the report contained neither a balance sheet nor an income
statement while the total revenues and ordinary expenses were
stated only in the management narrative.
Among companies that included balance sheets in their an-
nual reports, there was no uniform style. Each company devel-
oped its own format and decided what was to be included on
the statement. The formats of most balance sheets, however,
were variations on the “account form,” “columnar trial balance”
form, and the “beginning of the [use of the] ‘report’ ” form
[Littleton, 1933, p. 143]. The columnar trial balance form was
similar to today’s work sheet in that a trial balance was ex-
tended to various columns such as a balance sheet column and,
in time, “the inclusion of a profit-and-loss column” [Littleton,
1933, p. 143].
Regardless of the format, assets on the balance sheet were
not classified into categories (e.g., current assets).2  Moreover, it
was often the practice to offset certain assets with liabilities
and present only the net amount as the balance: in some cases
basically creating net working capital. For example, on the bal-
ance sheet of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., 1870, receiv-
ables were presented under the heading “Cash assets, Notes
2Although Littleton [1933, p. 149] stated that one of the greatest innova-
tions in financial reporting was the “grouping of data into sub-sections,” he
pointed out that in the United States broader classification concepts had to be
resolved before this could occur. Littleton [1933, p. 149] wrote “In the nine-
teenth century ... some wished them called real and representative … others
wished accounts classified as material, property, personal, profit-and-loss; still
others as real, personal and imaginary … [Thus] the generally accepted classi-
fication of real and nominal accounts came later, as did the sub-division of the
balance-sheet into current assets.”
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receivables, etc. deducting Liabilities, $2,197,959.51.” With this
presentation, the reader had the amount of working capital of
the company. However, there were no individual amounts for
either assets or liabilities.
In 1865, the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company [1865,
pp. 24-26] issued its 44th annual report which included both a
“profit and loss account” and a “summary of the liabilities and
assets,” however, accounts on neither statement were classified.
The only headings on the “balance sheet” were Liabilities (listed
first) and Assets. Under Liabilities, equity was listed first fol-
lowed by liability accounts. Lehigh’s $11+ million of assets were
represented by only six accounts which are presented in Exhibit
1. The six assets were apparently listed in inverse order of li-
quidity.
EXHIBIT 1
Asset Section, Balance Sheet, January 1, 1865
Report of The Board of Managers
Lehigh Coal and Navigation
Canal and River Improvements $ 4,455,000.00
Lehigh and Susquehanna Rail-road 1,917,895.35
Real Estate, cost of coal mine land. . .
and improvements 2,072,984.50
Moveable effects, Debts due the Company,
Bills Receivable, Bonds and Mortgages, &c. 2,128,112.02
Contingent Fund: cost of investments 640,952.02
Cash on hand  165,975.86
––––––––––––––
$11,380,919.75
Due to state incorporation laws, railroads were subject to
greater regulation and annual reports were often required
[Littleton and Zimmerman, 1966, p. 94]. State laws, however,
were often vague and charters did not always address
management’s reporting responsibilities [Hawkins, 1963, p.
136]. Thus, the reporting practices varied widely between rail-
roads and from year to year within the same railroad. Some
railroads provided no annual reports as was seen when the New
York Stock Exchange asked the Delaware, Lackawanna & West-
ern R.R. Co. for copies of any reports that it had recently
issued. In its reply to the NYSE, the Railroad declared
[McLaren, 1947, pp. 4-5]: “The Delaware, Lackawanna & West-
ern R.R. Co. make no reports and publish no statements and
have done nothing of the sort for the last five years.”
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In contrast to no reports or minimum accounts by some
railroads, the balance sheet (represented by a General Account)
of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, 1865
showed over 20 types of assets. However, there was no sub-
classification of assets and items such as cash and freight re-
ceivables were offset with liabilities for wages and materials.
During this period, companies that intended to present a
more complete financial picture had few reporting guidelines
available. Unlike in Britain, U.S. companies had no railway or
companies acts to provide basic models for financial state-
ments.3  It would be nearly two decades before practitioner
journals such as Accountics and the Book-Keeper emerged with
discussions of such accounting concerns.
In the few accounting/bookkeeping texts that were avail-
able at the time of the Civil War, the preparation of financial
statements often was ignored. For example, the 60th edition of
Mayhew’s Practical Book-Keeping [1861, p. 6] devoted 200 pages
to a discussion of “general book-keeping, commercial calcula-
tions, philosophy & morals of business, and double entry book-
keeping.” It did not, however, address or illustrate either a
profit and loss statement or a balance sheet.
One author of the period that went beyond bookkeeping
was Thomas Jones. In contrast to writers even in the early
1900s, Jones’ 1855 Bookkeeping and Accountantship dealt
broadly with the issue of valuing current resources. Under the
heading of “Resources”, Jones [1855, p. vii] listed “Merchandise
on hand valued at,” which Jones explained was “an estimated
value [set] upon his merchandise.” Moreover, Jones advocated
that each year a company establish a reserve account in which
the estimated bad debts of the following year would be re-
corded.
A later text that examined the preparation of a balance
sheet was the 1878 Bryant and Stratton Common School Book-
3The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 offered a model balance sheet on
which assets were classified into three categories (property held by the com-
pany, debts owing to the company, and cash and investments). These in turn
were sub-classified into categories such as immoveable (i.e., buildings) and
moveable (stock in trade) property. Moreover, on the balance sheet, “receiv-
ables” were to be divided into good and “debts [receivable] considered doubtful
and bad” [Edey and Panitpakdi, 1956, pp. 364-365]. In regard to the separation
of current items on the Companies Act, 1856 model balance sheet, Chatfield
[1996b, p. 63] writes: “The distinction made by classical English economists
between fixed and circulating capital may have persuaded legislators to sepa-
rate current from long-term assets and liabilities.”
8
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 28 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/4
71Normand and Wootton: Recognition and Valuation of Current Assets
Keeping. The balance sheet presented in this text was based
upon the columnar work sheet concept. That is, the initial trial
balance was extended to succeeding columns designated: in-
ventory, business accounts, stock, and financial statement
[Packard and Bryant, 1878, p. 141]. The financial statement
column in turn was separated into two columns — resources
(assets) and liabilities (liabilities and capital). No reserves
(allowances) for either bad debts or depreciation were shown.
As Brief [1969, pp. 1-2] points out, external influences can
impact accounting behavior. However, at this time with the
exception of banks, external influences were minimal. For ex-
ample, in 1869, the NYSE’s Committee on Stock List adopted
the policy that, once listed on the Exchange, companies must
publish an annual financial report. Many companies, however,
did not follow the policy and the NYSE usually did not take
action [Hawkins, 1963, p. 149].
In contrast to many other external influences, the U.S. judi-
ciary has both a review process and an enforcement mecha-
nism. Because of these characteristics, the legal system has
played an important role in the development of accounting
standards and practices. As Mills [1988, p. 13] writes in The
Legal Literature of Accounting: “accounting practices have been
subject to and shaped by legal constraints throughout their his-
tory.” Moreover, as Reid [1987, p. 256] points out, legal actions
often predate the development of an accounting concept.
At a time when some companies did not provide financial
statements and most companies did not classify their balance
sheets, courts began to respond to the needs of the public. One
early case was Rubber Company v. Goodyear [1869].4  Although
the case largely dealt with patent issues, an additional concern
of the Court was the costs which should be considered in a
company’s determination of profit. Justice Swayne, writing for
the United States Supreme Court [9 Wall. 804], stated that
among: “other necessary expenditures, if there be any, and bad
debts, are to be taken into the account, and usually nothing
else.” Thus, under the court’s reasoning, a company’s profits
should reflect an estimate for bad debts. Although the court
gave consideration to the profit and loss statement, it did not
address the corresponding effect on assets in the balance sheet.
4Full legal citations for all cases are presented in the references.
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THE EMERGENCE OF LARGE CORPORATIONS, 1880-1899
During the last decades of the 19th century, the business
environment in America changed drastically. As Alfred D. Chan-
dler [1959, p. 4] points out, America was transformed from a
largely agrarian economy to one in which “major industries
were dominated by a few firms that had become great, verti-
cally integrated, centralized enterprises.” It was a time of merg-
ers and the creation of substantial industrial and distribution
corporations such as General Electric Company, United States
Rubber Company, and Sears, Roebuck & Company. With the
growth of such companies, ownership was separated from man-
agement while shareholders became more numerous and im-
portant. As corporations sought outside sources of capital, they
faced new demands for financial information because investors,
bankers, and bureaucrats often had to rely on financial state-
ments for decision making [Littleton, 1933, p. 366].
Although there was an increase in the importance of finan-
cial information, there was little change in the preparation and
appearance of the financial statements themselves. In contrast
to Britain, where the concept of stewardship greatly influenced
the concept of the balance sheet, the preparation of the balance
sheet in the U.S. continued to be influenced by the needs of
creditors. It was during the last decade of the nineteenth cen-
tury that requests by banks for financial statements became “a
widespread practice” [Horrigan, 1968, p. 285]. Reflecting on
why the liquidity concept continued to prevail in the U.S.,
Montgomery [1912, p. 212] wrote: “it has the sanction of the
bankers and credit men of this country, who use balance sheets
oftener than any other class.”
Even with new demands for financial information, the atti-
tude prevalent in the previous period toward the disclosure of
financial information often prevailed. Consequently, companies
often did not keep stockholders informed of the results of their
operations, the information provided was influenced by the
viewpoint of the managers, and the information was often un-
reliable because of what it excluded [Hawkins, 1963, pp.135].
Moreover, the information provided was often of little value for
inter-company comparisons because there were few accepted
rules for the recognition of financial items such as depreciation
or reserves [Previts and Merino, 1998, pp.125-126]. Even in
regulated industries such as railroads, where more detailed in-
formation was required, accounting practices varied with state
requirements [Hawkins, 1963, p. 135].
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In this environment, reporting practices varied widely de-
spite a growing need for financial information. For example, in
1881, American Bell Telephone’s Report of the Directors did not
include a balance sheet. The following year, American Bell’s
annual report [1882, p. 10] included a balance sheet, however,
over $7 million of assets were listed in seven broad categories
such as patents, other stocks and bonds, merchandise, and bills
& accounts receivable. A reserve account was presented on the
liabilities side of the report but its purpose was not disclosed.
In 1885, Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company issued its 64th
Annual Report that included both a “revenue and expenses”
statement and a “balance sheet.” The 1885 balance sheet, how-
ever, differed little from the 1865 balance sheet (see Exhibit 1)
except that a greater number of accounts were shown. As in
1865, the 1885 balance sheet neither classified the assets (e.g.,
current) nor valued the assets (receivables or plant).
Despite the greater detail provided in the annual reports of
railroads, the structure of their financial statements had not
advanced much beyond those of other corporations.5  Little or
no classification or valuation was presented. Although some
railroads did provide information about selected accounts in a
narrative or supporting statements, these statements led to con-
fusion. For example, on a financial statement included in the
1880 fiscal year report [1881, p. 38] of the Atchison, Topeka,
and Santa Fe Railroad Co., Accounts Receivable was valued at
$1,428,008.67. In General Statement 4, however, Bills Receiv-
able (not accounts receivable) was listed as $2,288,185.82
which included $119,599.82 interest on delinquent accounts.
Then, in a separate narrative, the following information was
provided:
Our bills receivable Dec. 31, 1880, on live sales,
amount to $2,288,185.82. Of this amount, $341,006.45
5The developing nature of the balance sheet was shown in a 1883 article in
The American-Counting Room. In “Counting-Rooms Chats,” readers posed
questions for the writers to answer. A reader asked: “what form of balance-
sheet is best and shortest.” In reply, the article [“On Balance-Sheet,” 1883, p.
346] stated that the columnar (worksheet) balance sheet form, “in actual busi-
ness it has become almost universally condemned.” Then, the article illustrated
two acceptable forms for a balance sheet. The first was a simple “trial balance
resource and liability” form with all assets’ balances on the debit side and
liabilities (including capital) on the credit side. The second example was a
“financial condition of the business” statement. Under this format, assets were
classified in three categories: actual resources (cash, real estate), commercial
resources (merchandise, other companies’ stock), and personal resources
(bills-receivable, accounts-receivable).
11
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is overdue and unpaid. During the year 1880, dead
sales to the amount of 10,496.73 acres, $55,989.91,
have been cancelled.
The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe continued this method of
reporting receivables on the balance sheet throughout the 19th
century.
Unfortunately, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) did
not address variation in balance sheet reporting. In 1869, the
exchange had established a requirement that newly listed com-
panies must publish annual financial reports, but the NYSE
generally did not enforce its policy.6  In 1885, the NYSE further
weakened the policy by establishing a dual listing of stocks. In
order to attract companies that did not want to disclose finan-
cial information, the NYSE created an Unlisted Department
where companies “were not required to furnish the Exchange
with financial information relevant to the issue . . . neverthe-
less, these shares were traded with regularly listed securities,
unlisted stocks being distinguished on quotation sheets only by
an asterisk” [Hawkins, 1963, p. 150].
While the NYSE was lessening its disclosure requirements,
American courts were establishing new guidelines. In 1890, the
issue of the proper inclusion and valuation of current assets
was addressed by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Hubbard v.
Weare. Examining several accounts, which the appellant con-
tended “were improperly included as assets, and others omitted
from the statement of liabilities,” the court set guidelines for
the balance sheet. In regard to inventory, the Iowa court held
that “until it had an actual value it should not have been in-
cluded as an asset.” The court then addressed the issue of the
valuation of receivables. The appellee had listed on his 1879
balance sheet receivables with a value of $22,821.39; however,
no provision had been made for a loss. The Supreme Court of
Iowa held that the reported value of receivables on the balance
sheet must include an estimate for the “shrinkage or loss in
collections,” for “without such an approximation, the result
would not show with any reasonable certainty the state of the
company’s affairs” [Hubbard v. Weare, 44 N.E. 920]. Thus, with
this decision, we see judicial precedent for changes in the way
assets were valued and reported which coincides with Reid’s
6For example, as late as 1923, over 30% of NYSE listed companies were
not required to issue annual reports to their shareholders, and only 25% of the
companies provided both annual and quarterly reports to their shareholders
[Seligman, 1995, p. 48].
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[1987, p. 256] proposition that legal actions often predate the
development of an accounting concept. Subsequently, other
courts established similar guidelines.
Perhaps because the courts were beginning to set account-
ing principles through legal actions during the 1890s, account-
ing and auditing texts were more expansive in their coverage of
current assets. For example, Dicksee’s7  1892 Auditing included
a page and a half discussion of “bad and doubtful debts.” In his
guideline for receivables, Dicksee [1892, p. 45] wrote:
An intelligent system of dealing with the difficult ques-
tion of Bad and Doubtful Debts is of such assistance to
all commercial houses that the Auditor should lose no
opportunity of suggesting that the matter be put upon
a scientific basis.
Dicksee’s scientific basis consisted of two phases. First, as
soon as a debt became sufficiently overdue to merit attention, it
should be transferred to a “Doubtful Debts Ledger.” Dicksee
[1892, p. 46], however, cautioned that an account should not be
written off “until it is irretrievably bad.” The second phase con-
sisted of establishing a provision for Bad and Doubtful Debts
through a Bad Debts Suspense Account. The suspense account
was credited with the estimated loss while the Bad Debts Ac-
count was debited “in the usual way” [ibid].8
7Due to the scarcity of American accounting texts, during the late 1800s
and early 1900s, basic British accounting texts or American versions of British
texts often were used. On this scarcity, John Carey [1969, p. 101] writes “in the
first 30 years of its existence, however, the American accounting profession
had little native technical literature with which to work.” On the importance of
British writers, Carey [1969, p. 101] adds: “[at this time], the most important
book available was the American edition of Auditing: A Practical Manual for
Auditors, by Lawrence R. Dicksee, Professor of Accounting at the University of
Birmingham, England. The American version was edited by the amazing Rob-
ert H. Montgomery.” One interesting aspect of Dicksee’s Auditing was its con-
sideration of the effects of legal rulings upon the profession and its liability. In
addition to legal discussions in the body of the text, Appendix B contained
nearly forty pages of “Reports of Cases, The Decisions of which are of Profes-
sional Interest.”
8In Auditing, Dicksee [1892] did not state whether the created “suspense”
account for bad debts should appear on the liability side of the balance sheet
or as an offset to accounts receivable. Later in his Advanced Accounting, he
stated that while the created “reserve” account could be shown on the liability
side of the balance sheet; “it is preferable, however, in the case of Reserve
Accounts raised to provide for shrinkage in the value of specific assets, to
deduct them from those particular assets, in which case, no entry whatever
will appear upon the liabilities’ side of the balance sheet” [1903, p. 232].
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In the early 1890s, many corporations did not follow the
lead of the courts or the texts. For example, United States Rub-
ber Company (USR) issued its first annual report in 1893. Its
financial statements provided minimum information. Only five
categories were employed for USR’s $29 million assets and all
liabilities were listed in one account. No provision for losses in
the receivables or valuation of plant assets were shown. USR
continued its minimal reporting throughout the 1890s and into
the early 1900s except that in most years assets were listed in
four categories. However, in one sense, USR’s balance sheet
was forward looking because current assets were listed first. At
this time, many American companies followed the British prac-
tice of listing current assets last, and it was not until the late
1930s that several large industrial companies reversed the prac-
tice.9  The 1893 asset section of USR’s balance sheet is pre-
sented in Exhibit 2.
EXHIBIT 2
Asset Section, Balance Sheet, March 31, 1893
First Annual Report
United States Rubber Company
Cash on hand and in bank $25,456,194.02
Notes and Accounts Receivable 2,846,163.50
Value of Rubber and other Mdse.
on hand, estimated  674,011.51 $ 3,576,369.03
––––––––––––––
Furniture and Fixtures:
New York and Boston $4,587.18
Investments  $25,267,833.69  25,272,420.87
–––––––––––––– ––––––––––––––
Total Assets $28,848,789.90
In contrast to the minimal financial reporting practices of
companies such as American Bell Telephone and United States
Rubber, a few corporations provided information about their
current assets. For example, in January 1893, General Electric
9Littleton and Zimmerman [1962, pp. 92-93] in Accounting Theory: Conti-
nuity and Change stated there was a logic in the British and American presen-
tations of current assets — “The British had a strong natural interest in the
relationship of permanent capital and fixed assets. Belief in the interpretative
usefulness of placing these elements at the top of the balance sheet is a logical
result of such an interest. … [In America] the party most interested in seeing
the balance sheet was the lender; his chief concern was logically the borrower’s
ability to repay a short-term loan.”
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Company (GE) issued its first annual report and much of the
current asset data presented is similar to that included today.
In its report, GE listed Stocks And Bonds Of Local Cos., Cash,
Notes Receivable, Accounts Receivable, Inventories, and Work
In Progress in a classification titled “Other Assets.” GE was
unique in including the last account, for at that time, work in
progress often was not listed on the balance sheet. It was not
until nearly 50 years later that Dun & Bradstreet [Foulke, 1945,
p. 81] would emphasize that a comprehensive balance sheet
must include “a breakdown of the inventory of manufacturers
into three parts, raw materials, in process, and finished merchan-
dise” (emphasis Foulke).
Again unique for the period, GE estimated the net realiz-
able value of two current assets (inventories and receivables)
while many companies valued neither. Inventories were listed
at $2,307,225.13 “less 10%” for an estimated net realizable
value of $2,075,502.62. The basis for the 10% reduction was
not given. Also, listed at estimated net realizable values were
Notes Receivable ($5,151,950.64) and Accounts Receivable
($7,078,879.15). Although there were no indications on the bal-
ance sheet that receivables had been evaluated, in the text of
the Report, GE [1893, p. 7] stated “after careful examination,
deductions have been made from the notes and accounts receiv-
able to cover fully all bad and doubtful items.”
In General Electric’s annual report, 1895 the “Other Asset”
section was dropped and instead all assets were reported on the
left side of the balance sheet with no subheadings. In contrast
to the reduction of information on the balance sheet itself, GE’s
management [1895, p. 10] expanded its discussion of receiv-
ables:
This account represents what is believed to be a con-
servative value of notes and open accounts of custom-
ers, after deducting and charging off to Profit and Loss
old notes and accounts receivable of 466 debtors, not
now dealt with except on a C.O. D. basis, amounting to
$2,291,844.48, heretofore carried at $234,973.69, but
no longer carried as assets, except for the aggregate
sum of $466, being one dollar for each debtor. They
will be liquidated as speedily as possible.
Although most large industrial companies still did not clas-
sify their balance sheets, by 1890 several major railroads had
started to do so and included, among other subheadings, a sec-
tion for current assets. For example, the balance sheet in The
Great Northern Railway Company’s first Annual Report [1890]
15
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included a current asset section in which cash, receivables, and
“material supply” were listed. There was, however, no provision
for losses associated with the receivables.
In the same year, the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail-
road Company (AT&SF) issued a detailed balance sheet listing
nearly $350 million of assets classified under five major head-
ings (Franchise & Property, Permanent Investments, Other In-
vestments, Deferred, and Current). Each heading in turn had
sub-headings. Under the Current heading were the sub-head-
ings Accounts Receivables, Bills Receivable, Cash, and Securi-
ties Owned. Instead of listing inventory as a current asset, the
AT&SF listed “Material and fuel in stock” as a “Deferred” item
along with “Sundry Advances” and “Deposits.” Like The Great
Northern, the AT&SF made no provisions for bad debts or de-
preciation.
Although many companies did not include provisions for
bad debts, by the end of the 1890s the importance of such a
provision was being discussed. For example, in April 1897, P.
W. Sherwood presented a paper to the Associated Accountants
entitled “The Preparation of Accounts for Legal and Other Pur-
poses” which was published in Accountics. In his paper,
Sherwood discussed the importance of the proper preparation
of the financial statements, and he emphasized that receivables
on the balance sheet must be reported at their estimated net
realizable values. Sherwood’s [June 1897, p. 54] illustration of
the proper valuation and presentation of receivables is pre-
sented in Exhibit 3.
EXHIBIT 3
Presentation of Receivables on the Balance Sheet
P. W. Sherwood, April 1897
Accounts Receivable $50,000
Deduct Worthless Accounts $6,200
Deduct Accounts Appraised at 50 percent 6,000
Deduct Accounts Appraised at 30 percent  2,000  14,200
–––––– ––––––––
35,800
Add Accounts at 50 percent of $6,000 3,000
Add Accounts at 30 percent of $2,000  600  3,600
–––––– ––––––––
$39,400
––––––––
Source: Sherwood, P.W. [1897], “The Preparation of Accounts For Legal and
Other Purposes,” Accountics, Vol. 1, June: 54.
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MINIMAL UNIFORMITY IN STATEMENTS, 1900-1920
At the turn of the century, there was increased public con-
cern regarding potential market abuses by large corporate
trusts [Merino and Neimark, 1982, p. 45]. Partially, as a result
of these concerns, in June 1898, Congress established the U.S.
Industrial Commission to hold hearings on the possible re-
straint of trade by large corporations [Previts and Merino, 1998,
p. 184].10  During four years of hearings, various examples of
corporate abuses relating to competition and stock issuance
were presented and, in 1902, the Commission issued its recom-
mendations.
In the Commission’s Final Report, Thomas W. Phillips set
forth recommendations that included the need for independent
audits, recognition of potential conflicts of interest, preparation
of financial statements, and liability for material misstate-
ments. Moreover, the Report [Phillips, 1902, p. 3] recommended
that the balance sheet include: “A statement of the method of
valuing assets, whether at cost price, by appraisal, or otherwise,
and of the allowance made for depreciation.” Because the
Commission’s proposals were only recommendations, com-
panies often ignored its demands for greater disclosure.11  The
lack of disclosure can vividly be seen in the 1905 balance sheet
of American Smelting and Refining Company (AS&RC). With
over $113 millions in assets, AS&RC reported its assets in only
five broad categories: Property ($86,845,670.51), Investments
($3,982,576.08), Metal Stocks ($16,418,542.68), Material
($1,118,901.73) and Cash ($4,636,649.18). No receivables, de-
preciation, or reserves were listed on the balance sheet.
In October 1906, in response to the growing demand for
information, Thomas Warner Mitchell began a series of twelve
articles12  in The Journal of Accountancy on the topic of financial
10 For a further discussion of the history of the U.S. Industrial Commission
see Barbara Merino [1996] “U.S. Industrial Commission.”
11Vangermeersch [1979, pp. 1-3] points out that the financial reports of
early companies sometimes did not even include balance sheets and it was not
until the 1920s that several major companies first reported current assets as a
separate section of the balance sheet. Vangermeersch also points out that com-
panies that reported current assets often listed them in an inverse order of
liquidity.
12“The October 1906 column was not attributed to Mitchell but the others
[articles] were” [Brief, 1986, “Introduction,” np]. Thomas Warner Mitchell was
a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and a widely “perceptive” analyst
[see Brief, 1986, “Introduction,” np].
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reports and financial analysis [Brief, 1986, “Introduction,” np].
These articles, in the Journal’s words [Editorial, 1906, p. 458],
were: “a critical review of the reports of American Corpora-
tions.”13  In his articles, Mitchell often criticized the lack of
information in statements, lack of review by an independent
accountant, and the company’s manner of presentation. Some-
times, Mitchell suggested ways for improving the statement.
For example, in reviewing the International Paper Company’s
current assets, Mitchell [1907, p. 397] stated the problem with
presenting only a simple listing of assets:
This assumes that the inventories and accounts and
bills receivable were stated at their real worth in the
balance sheets; of course if the inventories could be
duplicated at much less cost or if the ‘accounts and
bills receivable’ included an accumulation of ‘dead
wood’ from past years, the working capital has been
impaired and is really much less than the sums stated.
During this time, accounting writers began to devote more
time to the importance of the balance sheet and the presenta-
tion of current assets. In The Philosophy of Accounts, after stat-
ing that he thought the American mode (assets on the left) of
preparing the balance sheet was preferable, Sprague considered
the order of items on the balance sheet. He wrote: “The ar-
rangement of the items in the balance sheet is of some impor-
tance especially if the list is voluminous.” [Sprague, 1913, pp.
32-33]. Although in an example of a balance sheet, he listed the
items in order of “liquidation,” Sprague stated that an argu-
ment could be made that “in an industrial enterprise where it
was thought that productivity or earning power was more
important . . . it might be that the fixt [sic] plant was entitled to
the first place among the asset.” [ibid.] Sprague then added:
“But, at any rate, some (emphasis Sprague) principle of ar-
rangement is better than haphazard.” [ibid].14
13In August and September of 1910, The Journal of Accountancy again
examined the proper preparation and presentation of the balance sheet in two
articles by John Noone [1910a,b].
14Although the classified balance sheet was becoming the common illustra-
tion, many textbooks [e.g., Cole, 1910, Paton & Stevenson, 1916] continued to
list plant assets as the first classification. On the importance of the order,
Paton and Stevenson [1916, p. 188] wrote: “Some accountants prefer to place
the current assets and current liabilities above the fixed assets and capital, but
the location of these groups is a matter of minor importance.”
18
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In his 1909 landmark [Zeff, 2000, p. 93] text Modern
Accounting: Its Principles and Some of Its Problems, Hatfield
extensively examined the valuation and presentation of specific
current assets on the balance sheet. In his biography of
Hatfield, Zeff [2000, p. 95] points out that Hatfield with Modern
Accounting became a pioneer in the development of the concept
of the contra or offset approach of presenting valuation ac-
counts on the balance sheet. In his discussion on inventory,
Hatfield [1909, pp. 101-102] stated that although the “going
concern” concept made a strong logical case that “merchandise
for sale be valued at the present selling price with a reduction
to cover selling expenses” generally accepted practice required
“merchandise shall be inventoried at cost.” Moreover, Hatfield
[1909, p. 101] continued “prudence further demands that mer-
chandise which evidently cannot be sold except at a loss, be
marked down even below cost.”
Hatfield also devoted three and a half pages to the record-
ing and valuation of book accounts, acceptances, and promis-
sory notes. In addition to discussing the merits of the percent-
age of sales or receivables methods in estimating allowances,
Hatfield linked the account-specific information with a discus-
sion of reserve accounts and their impact on the Surplus ac-
count.15  According to Hatfield, the Allowance for Bad Debt had
to be established in order to properly value the Surplus account
so that the appropriate dividends could be paid.
The influence of the judiciary upon the establishment of
accounting standards can be seen in Hatfield’s writings. For
example, Hatfield cited the 1869 Supreme Court case of Rubber
Company V. Goodyear [9 Wall. 788] in his Modern Accounting.
In regard to the court’s influence and guidance, Hatfield [1912,
p. 100] wrote:
That such allowance should be made is not only dic-
tated by business prudence and accounting practices,
but is as well commanded by the United States Su-
preme Court. . . . The amount is to be decided in each
individual case but it certainly should not be much
15Hatfield [1912, p. 233] explained the Surplus account as: “But it is un-
usual to distribute all of the profits earned and there is ordinarily further
action by the directors or stockholders deciding to retain part of the profits.
The profits thus reserved from distribution are called Surplus, and constitute
an addition to the capital of the concern.”
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below what has been generally accepted in the specific
business concerned.
Following this ruling, Hatfield [1912, p. 100] provided the
following illustration as the proper presentation of receivables
and allowances:
Bills Receivable $99,900
Less Allowance for doubtful debts  100 $99,800
––––––––
Hatfield’s example of valuing receivables and presenting
the related bad debts as a subtraction from the receivables was
echoed in Montgomery’s 1912 Auditing Theory and Practice.
However, Hatfield’s contra-approach towards the allowance ac-
count was not universally accepted. In his 1910 text Accounting
and Auditing, Cole indicated that the allowance account should
be shown as a liability account separated from Accounts Re-
ceivable. Cole [1910, pp. 324-325] supported his position with
the following statement:
A devise must be provided therefore to reduce assets by
the amount of expected shrinkage in these claims; and
yet if that reduction is made by subtracting from any
figure of assets, the balance sheet is out of accord with
the books. We saw long ago that subtraction is practi-
cally never performed in bookkeeping, and, therefore,
we fall back on the devise of increasing the other side
. . . Its appearance on the liability side of the balance
sheet indicates that the business is responsible to make
good this shrinkage, and that the amount has been
subtracted from income to satisfy that responsibility.
Several other authors of accounting textbooks agreed with
Cole’s approach to the reporting of the allowance account. For
example, Klein [1913] and Paton and Stevenson [1918] advo-
cated that the allowance should be included on the equity side
of the balance sheet.
Despite these discussions of current assets, some large cor-
porations16  still provided a minimum amount of financial infor-
mation. However, by 1910, other companies had begun to clas-
sify balance sheets and to establish reserve accounts for
16For example, on their 1910 non-classified balance sheets, American
Smelting & Refining Company reported over $93 million of assets in only five
categories while United States Rubber Company reported over $120 million of
assets in eight categories.
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selected assets.17  One of the leading companies18  in this regard
was International Harvester Company (IH) which, in the early
1900s, began extensive disclosure and evaluation of its current
assets (inventories, receivables, and cash). For example, in its
1908 Report, IH stated in a narrative that all inventories (raw
materials, work in progress, finished goods) were reported at
the lower of original production cost, actual purchase price, or
current market price. Moreover, IH provided a supporting
schedule of the inventory. Receivables were listed on the bal-
ance sheet offset by an accumulated reserves for contingent
losses, and a note on the balance sheet indicated that a discus-
sion of the contingent losses could be found on a separate page.
Here, IH presented the loss reserve at the beginning of 1908,
the amount written off in 1908, and the loss provision estab-
lished for 1908. Finally, due to the length of time it extended for
credit, IH stated that it was its policy to maintain a reserve to
reflect the expenses incurred in the collection of receivables.
Although IH was a leader in the disclosure and valuation of
current assets, the order in which they were presented was tra-
ditional. As did most companies, longer-life current assets were
listed first and cash listed last [Claire, 1945, p. 49]. The 1908
current asset section of IH’s balance sheet is presented in Ex-
hibit 4.
17Merino and Neimark [1982] write that a major reason for the increased
disclosure by select companies was to avoid future federal regulation. In the
early 1900s, there were increased expressions of concern about the reporting
policies of many companies. This concern was expressed in hearings before the
Industrial Commission, the final report of the Commission, and in Mitchell’s
series of articles in The Journal of Accountancy.
18Two other leading companies at this time in the reporting of current
assets were General Electric Company and Westinghouse Electric and Mfg. Co.
Although its 1910 Balance Sheet was not classified, GE defined the major
current assets (e.g., work in progress, receivables, consignments) in a narrative
and stated that proper allowances had been made for losses in the accounts. In
confirmation of this, GE’s auditor (Marwick, Mitchell & Company) in its re-
port [1910, p. 26] stated: “The amount at which the notes and accounts receiv-
able are included in the Balance Sheet represents their realizable value. . . . We
have satisfied ourselves that these inventories have been carefully taken, that
have been valued at cost price or under, and that due allowance has been made
for old and inactive stocks.” For 1910, Westinghouse Electric presented a de-
tailed classified balance sheet-listing both current and working & trading as-
sets sections. The latter section included raw materials, work in progress, fin-
ished goods, and goods on consignment. In the liability section, Westinghouse
listed a reserve for loss account; however, it was a general reserve which
included potential losses on materials, finished goods, and receivables.
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EXHIBIT 4
Current Assets, Combined Balance Sheet,
December 31, 1908
The International Harvester Company
Inventories:
Finished Products, Raw
Materials, etc., at close of
1908 Season $33,854,932.88
Subsequent Material
Purchases and Manufacture
for 1909 Season 13,832,123.38
––––––––––––––
$47,687,056.26
Receivables:
Farmers’ and Agents’ Notes $25,471.132.81
Accounts Receivable  13,064,927.11
––––––––––––––
$38,536,059.92
––––––––––––––
Deduct:
Accumulated Reserves for
Contingent Losses, (See Page 7)  2,224,829.91 36,311,230.01
––––––––––––––
Cash  9,339,054.90
––––––––––––––
93,337,341.17
Although corporations like IH were moving toward more
disclosure, in April 1917, the first national attempt at a formal-
ization of authoritative reporting standards occurred with the
publication in the Federal Reserve Bulletin on “Uniform
Accounting” [Brief, 1987, p. 149].19  Prior to the statement’s
issuance, the Federal Trade Commission, under chairman
Edwin Hurley had strongly advocated the establishment of
“uniform accounts” for several industries, independently
19After the initial committee (Harvey Chase, George O. May, Robert H.
Montgomery) assigned to establish the criteria for an uniform plan for the
independent audit of the balance sheet failed to reach agreement, George O.
May (senior partner - Price Waterhouse) gave the committee a report by John
Scobie prepared several years before for Price Waterhouse’s internal use that
addressed the needs of an independent audit of financial statements [Allen and
McDermott, 1993, p. 51]. This report was accepted by the committee and
forwarded to the Federal Reserve. As related in the Federal Reserve Bulletin
[Uniform Accounting, 1917, p. 270], this report after approval by the FTC and
the FRB and conferences with the FTC and AIA, the FRB then “submitted it
[Uniform Accounting] to the banks, bankers, and banking associations
throughout the country for their consideration and criticism.”
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audited financial statements, and a federal register of account-
ants. After opposition by professional groups to specific aspects
of the proposals, Hurley, emphasizing the need for uniform
accounts and audits, transferred the proposal to the Federal
Reserve Board which had expressed an interest in the idea.
As Carey [1969, p. 132] writes:
The Federal Reserve Board, however, was keenly inter-
ested in the credit worthiness of organizations whose
commercial paper was discounted by Federal Reserve
Banks . . . the Board, therefore, had an immediate and
vital interest in the reliability of certified financial
statements of such enterprises.
Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board stated that a major impe-
tus for the issuance of the statement was the importance that
banks and bankers assigned to the balance sheet [Huizingh,
1967, p. 69]. In fact, in 1908, the Committee on Credit Informa-
tion of the American Bankers Association had recommended
that banks request “statements certified by reputable public ac-
countants,” however, “[banks’] fear of offending customers and
losing business was still too strong to permit effective enforce-
ment of such a regulation” [Brown, 1955, p. 13].
In 1917, after reviewing a major fraud case in which a
financial statement was not requested, Lough [p. 119] in Busi-
ness Finance wrote: “In the absence of financial statements . . .
there is really no method of telling whether a corporation is
borrowing beyond the limits of safety or not.” Moreover, Lough
[1917, p. 125] wrote that the Federal Reserve Bank “favors”
paper based upon certified financial statements and probably
will “insist that some evidence be given that bank loans are
‘self-liquidating’.” Finally, Foulke [1945, p. 599] wrote that the
Federal Reserve had a deep interest in the development of more
uniform methods for the preparation of the balance sheet, “so
that the analyst would have more uniformly reliable informa-
tion on which to base his interpretation of business figures.”
Although the “Uniform Accounting” statement (a joint ef-
fort between the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade
Commission, and the American Institute of Accountants) was
largely directed toward audit procedures, the report presented a
model “Comparative statement of profit and loss” and a “Form
of balance sheet,” for banks to follow. In 1918, the Federal Re-
serve Bulletin’s article was reissued in pamphlet form as the
Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance-sheet State-
ments. When compared to the balance sheets then being issued
23
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by many companies, the model statement was quite innovative.
As Vangermeersch [1996, p. 387] points out the “focus group of
the report was bankers performing their credit function by
short-term loans,” and thus, based upon their perceived needs,
“its [balance sheet] format was in the ‘current assets first for-
mat’ in the order of liquidity, except for marketable securities.”
This order was in sharp contrast to the British balance sheet, in
which capital and liabilities were listed first, and also differed
from the statements of many U.S. corporations in which long-
term assets were listed first.20
EXHIBIT 5
Uniform Accounts
Federal Reserve Bulletin
Current Assets, 1917 Form of Balance Sheet
Cash
1a. Cash on hand—currency and coin
1b. Cash in bank
Notes and accounts receivable:
3. Notes receivable of customers on hand (not past due)
5. Notes receivable discounted or sold with indorsement or
guaranty
7. Accounts receivable, customers (not past due)
9. Notes receivable, customers, past due (cash value $)
11. Accounts receivable, customers, past due (cash value $)
Less: Provisions for bad debts
Less: Provisions for discounts, freights, allowances, etc.
Inventories:
17. Raw materials on hand
19. Goods in progress
21. Uncompleted contracts
Less payments on account thereof
23. Finished goods on hand
Other quick assets (describe fully):
Total quick assets (excluding all investments)
Securities:
25. Securities readily marketable and salable without
impairing the business
27. Notes given by officers, stockholders, or employees
29. Accounts due from officers, stockholders, or employees
Total current assets
20As late as 1938, some major industrial companies continued to list long-
term assets first on their balance sheets [Vangermeersch, 1996, p. 387].
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Moreover, in contrast to many balance sheets, the model
balance sheet (presented in Exhibit 5) was classified (Current
Assets, Fixed Assets, Deferred Charges, Other Assets) with
noticeable detail about the classification of both “Quick and
Current Assets.” When Cash, Notes & accounts receivable, In-
ventories, and Other quick assets were combined, they created
“Total Quick Assets.” The addition of “Securities” to Quick
Assets created “Total Current Assets.” Heath [1978, pp. 32-33]
notes: “many different terms were used to describe asset cat-
egories during the early part of the century,” and this included
the quick assets — “often used as a synonym for current as-
sets.”21  On the balance sheet, assets were listed in the order of
liquidity starting with the current assets;22  a provisions for bad
debts was established and directly subtracted from receivables;
and inventories included raw materials, goods in process, un-
completed contracts, and finished goods. Later, “the more com-
prehensive financial statement forms of commercial banking
institutions, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., and larger mercantile
concerns” would require a breakdown of inventory similar to
this [Foulke, 1945, p. 81]. Although the pamphlet was directed
21In its description, the Federal Reserve [Uniform Accounting, 1917, p.
272] explained the use of the two terms: “The term ‘Quick assets’ is used here
in the sense in which it is used by Federal Reserve practice. ‘Current assets’ is
used to comprise these assets and other assets which through current are
excluded in determining the eligibility of the paper for Federal Reserve pur-
poses.” Although Heath [1978, p. 33] noted that at this time “quick assets” and
“current assets” were used sometimes interchangeably, “quick assets” at this
time could refer to a subcategory of current assets, namely cash, trade receiv-
able, and inventory-excluding only marketable securities and receivables from
stockholders, officers, and employees.”
22Even, leaders in informative financial reports such as Westinghouse
Electric and Mfg. Co. [Annual Report 1920, p. 10] still listed plant assets first
on the balance sheet. For Westinghouse Electric, recognition as a leader in the
area of financial disclosure was a major change. During the late and very early
1900s, Westinghouse was constantly cited as an example of a company that
held no annual meetings (1897-1906) and provided little or no financial in-
formation [Brief, 1987, p. 147]. Furthermore, Westinghouse had gone into
receivership in 1907; emerging in 1908. However, by 1910, Westinghouse’s
financial reports were among the most comprehensive and informative of
all major companies. In fact, after reviewing Westinghouse history and
financial problems, Arthur Dewing [1914, 200fn] in Corporate Promotions and
Reorganizations wrote: “This [Westinghouse] annual report of March 31, 1911,
is worthy of permanent preservation for its fullness, frankness . . . the present
writer knows not its equal among corporation reports.” For an interesting
history of the beginning, reorganization, receivership, and recovery of
Westinghouse Electric see Dewing’s Corporate Promotion and Reorganizations
[1924, pp. 165-202].
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primarily at banks, Huizingh [1967, p. 69] writes “large seg-
ments of the business community accepted the recommended
form . . . as extending to the preparation of all balance sheets.”
However, since the model balance sheet only was a recommen-
dation, its acceptance was limited.
At the same time as the model balance sheet was proposed,
courts again addressed the issue of current asset valuation and
the resulting effects of such valuations on the financial state-
ments.23  In Cameron v. First National Bank [1917], the Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas [194 S.W. 469] held that “to include in
such statements as assets accounts which had proven uncollect-
ible and which by general commercial custom and usage should
not be included in a financial statement” was sufficient to
charge the corporation’s directors with false representation of
the assets. In this case, a company had included in its receiv-
ables the accounts of deceased persons, persons in bankruptcy,
and accounts barred by limitation. Instead of charging such
accounts to the profit or loss, the company placed such ac-
counts in a “suspended ledger account” which continued to be
listed as an asset. Concluding, Chief Justice Pleasants for the
court [194 S.W. 474] considered: “This method of keeping
books and preparing financial statements is contrary to com-
mercial custom and usage.”
EXPANSION, DEPRESSION, AND REGULATION, 1921-1940
Beginning as a time of prosperity and ending with the start
of a major depression, events in the 1920s provided much of
the impetus for the greater self and governmental regulation of
financial statements that occurred in the 1930s. As the 1920s
began, there were major variations in the preparations of
the balance sheet especially in regard to current assets [Bax-
ter, 1951, p. 158].24  For example, in its annual report 1920,
23In Cornell v. Seddinger [1912, p. 396], the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that “Work in Progress” should not be reported at cost when the contract
price was “less by more than $180,000 than the vessels cost to build.”
24In 1926, The Atlantic Monthly published “From Main Street to Wall
Street” and “Stop, Look, Listen!” by William Z. Ripley (Professor of Economics
at Harvard University); these articles were quite critical of the financial report-
ing practices of many major corporations. The articles, later a part of Ripley’s
book Main Street and Wall Street [1927], provided numerous examples of the
inadequate and sometimes non-reporting practices of companies such as
United States Rubber Company, Royal Baking Powder Company, and National
Biscuit Company. In regard to the “progressive improvement in the practice of
accounting,” Foulke [1945, p. 596] credits Ripley as “probably the Renaissance
26
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American Can Company issued a non-classified balance sheet
with only five asset accounts (Plants, Real Estate, &c., Other
Investment Items, Cash, Accounts & Bills Receivable, Materials
& Products Inventory) totaling over $140 million.
Financial statements such as these probably prompted the
comments of authors such as William Z. Ripley [1927, p. 191]
who, in his widely read book, Main Street and Wall Street, wrote
“Balance sheets are prone to be inadequate or misleading in
two principal respects. One is downright omission of important
items . . . another is the failure to disclose the method of the
valuation.” To illustrate the vagueness of valuations, Ripley
[1927, p. 191] gave the example of Punta Alegre Sugar Com-
pany which listed on its balance sheet “Planted and Growing
Cane, $3,651,579.42.” In determining its value, Ripley [1927, p.
191] wondered “what price they counted on getting” and “how
they found out what the weather was going to be.”
In the reports that did classify assets, some companies
(e.g., Commonwealth Edison Company, Cuba Cane Sugar Cor-
poration, The North American Company) listed plant assets or
long-term investments first on the balance sheet while others
(e.g., General Motors Corporation, United States Rubber Com-
pany) listed current assets. Additionally, while some (e.g., Pa-
cific Gas and Electric Company, International Harvester Com-
pany) offset receivables directly with allowances (reserves),
others (e.g., Westinghouse Electric, Commonwealth Edison)
listed reserves in the liability section. In turn, reserves could be
specific or general in nature. For example, in a narrative, The
North America Company [1920, p. 6] stated it had increased its
general reserves by 27.14% which included “substantially in-
creasing the Reserves for Depreciation.” One major factor in
the increased acceptance of the allowance concept was the Rev-
enue Act of 1921. The 1921 Act allowed the use of bad debt
allowances, which as Chatfield [1996a, p. 59] writes: “encour-
of more recent years in this broad subject was due more to William Z. Ripley
than to any one other individual.” In a letter to the New York Times and in an
address to the AIA published in The Journal of Accountancy, George O. May
(Chairman of Price Waterhouse & Co.) responded to Ripley’s articles. Although
May [1926, pp. 321-324] stated that Ripley’s information was somewhat dated
and “did not constitute an altogether fair presentation of the situation which
exists today,” he conceded that improvements could be made in the reporting
process. Moreover, May wrote that it would be an advantage to corporations to
have common reporting standards for companies “who desire to be guided by
the best practice.”
27
Normand and Wooton: Recognition and valuation of current assets on the balance sheet in the United States, 1865-1940
Published by eGrove, 2001
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200190
aged taxpayers to anticipate bad debt losses and deduct them
before they occurred.”
During the 1920s, the reporting of inventories varied
among companies. Some companies (e.g., General Electric,
Westinghouse Electric) stated in a narrative that their invento-
ries were carried at the lower of cost or market while other
companies such as Sears, Roebuck and Co. stated on the bal-
ance sheet itself that inventories were carried at “Cost or Mar-
ket, Whichever is Lower.” American Woolen Company stated
on its balance sheet that its inventories were carried at market.
Companies that reported inventories at LCM often did not state
what market meant.
This problem was highlighted in a 1926 article in The Ac-
counting Review in which E. L. Kohler stated that, over the last
five years, there had been an increasing tendency to report in-
ventories at LCM; however, this information was not always
useful for “market has at present no commonly accepted busi-
ness meaning.” Kohler [1926, p. 5] therefore stressed: “Because
of the variations in the methods of valuing inventories, a bal-
ance sheet must be judged incomplete if the basis of the inven-
tory valuation has been omitted.”
Although there were substantial differences in the financial
statements of companies, accounting textbooks by the early
1920s were more uniform in their presentation of current assets
[Huizingh, 1967, p. 56]. In most textbooks, the classified bal-
ance sheet was the common illustration and current assets were
listed first.25  Despite this agreement, textbooks differed in their
definitions of what current assets were.26  For example, Kester
[1922, p. 26] in Accounting Theory and Practice provided the
following definition: “Asset items are classified as current if
conversion into cash is expected within three to six months,”
and included cash, receivables, and merchandise inventory.
Kester classified assets such as prepayments and most supplies
as Deferred Charges. In contrast, Montgomery [1922, p. 393] in
Auditing, Theory and Practice advocated that prepayments be
included with other current assets and predicted that “within a
25On the need for classification, Roy B. Kester [1922, p. 25] wrote: “The
balance sheet, accordingly, should be so arranged that the condition of the
business as related to its ability to pay its debts will be apparent.”
26Although “current” was the most commonly used term for this classifica-
tion of assets some writers such as Scovill [1924, p. 278] used the term “quick
assets” for the classification. Scovill noted that corporations used both terms
for the classification. On the Federal Reserve Bulletin’s 1917 Model Balance
Sheet, Current Assets minus Securities equaled Quick Assets.
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short time good accounting practice will sanction the inclusion
in current assets of all current prepayments.”27
By the early 1920s, more textbooks had adopted the use of
the net realizable method for receivables with the reserve (al-
lowance) account a direct offset on the balance sheet. In an
unusual twist, Montgomery advocated the use of the realizable
concept. However, he stated that the estimated uncollectible
amount need not be reported. Montgomery [1923, p. 128]
stated his reasoning:
It is not necessary to state in published balance sheets
the gross amount of accounts receivable and the re-
serves to be deducted therefrom. It is information of
interest to competitors more than to anyone else.
It is proper to state that accounts receivable are “net of
reserves,” but it is not necessary, because an unquali-
fied certificate implies that the accounts and notes re-
ceivable have been stated at their realizable value.
Unlike the other methods, Montgomery’s method actually pre-
sented less information by netting the two accounts.
Also, by the 1920s, the importance of ratio analysis had
been recognized. Arthur Andersen (founder of Arthur Andersen
& Co.) wrote an article for Manufacturing Industries entitled
“Operating and Balance Sheet Ratios.” In this article, Andersen
[1926, p. 351] wrote: “One of the most significant indices to the
condition of a business is that afforded through the use of ra-
tios developed from balance sheet and operating statement fig-
ures.” He then noted that of special importance was the “bank-
ers ratio” — that is the working capital ratio.
In 1929, the Federal Reserve Board issued Verification of
Financial Statements which was a revision of its 1917 balance
sheet audit guidelines and which, like its predecessor, included
a model balance sheet. Since its issuance in 1917, the “Uniform
Accounting” bulletin had become subject to the criticism that
its general instructions for an audit had actually “debased audit
standards” [Previts and Merino, 1998, p. 290]. Also, as Carey
points out, the 1929 guidelines were in response to the chang-
ing nature and needs of an audit and of financial statements.
The 1917 statement [Carey, 1969, p. 159] “stressed balance-
27Agreeing with Montgomery, Kohler [1926, p. 5] wrote: “Prepaid expenses,
such as insurance and rent, are always properly a part of current assets, al-
though often denied that classification by accountants.” Kohler cautioned that
it was important not to confuse prepaid expenses with deferred charges such
as organization costs which should be reported separately.
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sheet items, as was natural in that day when commercial bank-
ers, whom the bulletin was mainly intended to serve, were more
interested in liquidity than earning capacity.” In contrast, the
1929 bulletin stressed the importance of internal control and
“the use of tests instead of detailed verification when internal
controls were reliable” [ibid] as well as the increasing impor-
tant issue of income taxes which were not material in 1917.
Although similar, there were some differences between the
two models presented by the Federal Reserve Board in regard
to current assets. For example, the term “Current Assets” re-
placed “Quick Assets.” The valuation account to offset accounts
receivable was now the “reserve for bad debts” instead of “pro-
visions for bad debts.” In addition, more information on receiv-
ables was required on the balance sheet. If receivables had been
assigned, the amount of assignment had to be shown. Receiv-
ables from directors, officers and employees were to be listed
separately from trade receivables. On the 1917 statement, only
investments in short term securities were shown while on the
1929 statement, both current (marketable securities) and long-
term investments (securities of affiliated companies) were
listed.28  Inventories were to be “stated at cost or market price,
whichever are the lower at the date of the balance-sheet.”29  One
classification, however, did not change. On both model state-
28Verification of Financial Statements [1929, p. 329] distinguished between
the two types of investments: “Under the caption ‘Securities’ must be listed
securities in which surplus funds of the company or firm have been tempo-
rarily invested and those which are considered available as ‘current assets,’ i.e.,
items which can be turned into money in time of need. Where stocks of bonds
represent control of or a material interest in other enterprises, the ownership
of which constitutes value to the holder aside from the dividend or interest
return, they should be considered as permanent investments and be stated
apart from current assets in the balance sheet.”
29This prevailing academic viewpoint of inventory was in sharp contrast
with the base stock method set forth by Maurice Peloubet the name partner of
Peloubet & Co. (a leading accounting firm at that time) and former President
of the New Jersey Society of CPAs. In a presentation at the 1929 International
Congress of Accounting, Peloubet argued that current assets should be consid-
ered a “fixed investment” in that receivables, inventories, and supplies are
always present and normally are maintained at rather constant levels, and
therefore for certain business, it should be carried at original cost. Peloubet
[1930, p. 573] wrote: “Regardless of Government requirements the books of
corporations engaged in a business meeting the tests described above and the
financial statements drawn therefrom should show their inventories on a basis
of normal stocks at fixed prices so that the management and public may get a
true view of the position of the company and its realized, distributable net
income, unaffected by any marking up or down of a fixed asset.”
30
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 28 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/4
93Normand and Wootton: Recognition and Valuation of Current Assets
ments, “prepaid expenses, interest, insurance, taxes, etc.” were
listed not as current assets but as “Deferred charges” which
followed fixed assets on the balance sheet [Verification, 1929,
pp. 321-354].
To Heath [1978, p. 34] the continued classification of these
charges (and sometimes inventories) as non-current assets or in
a separate category (deferred items) reflected the influence of
bankers upon financial statements and “the bankers’ liquidating
point of view” in classifying assets. As Heath [1978, p. 34]
points out, to bankers, deferred charges “were clearly different
in some sense from cash and receivables,” and, moreover, there
was a question “whether deferred charges would yield anything
at all on liquidation.” Under this reasoning, if current is defined
as immediate liquidation to cash at or near stated value, then
deferred charges may be deemed closer to long-term assets than
current and thus classified as such.
During the 1920s, the courts dealt with two important
cases which addressed the valuation of current assets. In 1928,
in Branch, Trustee v. Kaiser et al., the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania while addressing the question of solvency and direc-
tors’ responsibility, examined the issue of inventory valuation.
Among other alleged misrepresentations on the balance sheet,
the Girard Grocery Company reported its sugar inventory at
cost — which ranged between 26 to 28 cents a pound. However,
after Girard had purchased the sugar, prices “suddenly dropped
to as low as 5 1/2 cents a pound, entailing in this one item, a
loss of $500,000.” On the importance of reporting a realistic
inventory value on the balance sheet, Justice Frazer [1928, pp.
546-547] writing for the court stated: “In addition, they pre-
sented inflated inventory sheets, giving to the actual merchan-
dise the company had on hand a cost valuation, when in fact
the value had enormously decreased.” Thus, under Pennsylva-
nia law, a material decline in the value of inventory had to be
recognized both in the income statement and on the balance
sheet.
In 1930, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals examined the
purpose and the proper presentation of the reserve for bad
debts on the balance sheet in Landesman-Hirschheimer Co. v.
Commissioner of Int. Rev. The court observed that the real pur-
pose of the reserve “is to show the probable, true, present value
of the accounts [receivable], or that sum which it is expected
will be realized from such accounts.” Therefore, for balance
sheet purposes, the appeals court [44 F.2d 522] stated:
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The real situation could better be shown by deducting
the amount of the reserve from the total of the ac-
counts receivable, on the asset side of the statement,
and thus fixing the valuation of accounts receivable at
that sum which is probably collectible thereon.
With these decisions and others, as pointed out by Berle
and Fisher [1932], by 1930 the support of the judiciary for the
valuation of receivables and merchandise inventory was rather
clear. Under the court’s rulings, receivables normally should be
reported at estimated net realizable value and inventories
should be reported at the lower of cost or market. Moreover,
Berle and Fisher noted that the law placed certain responsibili-
ties on the accountant to help ensure the proper valuation of
such accounts. Illustrating the accountant’s responsibility,
Berle and Fisher [1932, p. 600] addressed the valuation of re-
ceivables:
The law must look to the accountant to discover
whether the account receivable has in fact that quality
of collectivity connoted by the label which it bears;
whether the apparent realization of profit permitting
an addition to surplus in fact exists.
With the collapse of the securities market in 1929 and the
revelation of massive fraud in a New York Stock Exchange
listed company, the concept and requirements for financial re-
porting underwent a massive change. Moreover, the responsi-
bility and potential liability of management for financial re-
ports expanded. In January 1933, Richard Whitney (President
of the NYSE) announced that companies applying for a listing
on the NYSE had to have their financial statements (balance-
sheet, income statement, and surplus statement) certified as to
correctness by an independent public accountant. Mr. Whitney
insisted that the scope of the audit “must be not less than that
indicated” in the revised guidelines set forth by the Federal
Reserve Board in May, 1929 [Stock Exchange, 1933, pp. 81-82].
Additionally, in a letter to each listed company and published in
The Journal of Accountancy, Whitney emphasized the impor-
tance of the scope of the audit. He requested that each listed
company provide the NYSE with an auditor’s letter that ad-
dressed such points as “whether in their opinion the form of the
balance-sheet and of the income, or profit and loss, account is
such as fairly to present the financial position and the results of
operation” [Accountants, 1933, p. 242].
At the same time, landmarks in the regulation of account-
ing and financial reporting occurred — the passage of the Secu-
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rities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
The 1933 Act conferred upon the FTC the authority to prescribe
accounting methods for companies. Under the act, accountants
could be held liable for losses that resulted from material omis-
sions or misstatements in registration statements they had cer-
tified. The 1934 Act transferred the authority to prescribe ac-
counting methods to the newly established Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and required that financial state-
ments filed with the SEC be certified by an independent public
accountant. Moreover, the 1934 act gave the SEC “broad au-
thority to prescribe the form and content of financial state-
ments required to be filed by registrants.” Specifically, the SEC
was given the power to determine “the items or details to be
shown in the balance sheet” [Hills, 1957, p. 52].30  Thus, with
the passage of the securities acts of 1933 and 1934 and the
establishment of the SEC, the classified balance sheet and the
valuation of listed assets (e.g., accounts receivables, invento-
ries) were now a required part of financial reports for many
companies.
After the market crash, the resulting investigations, and the
securities acts of 1933-34, the accounting profession became
the target of substantial criticism for not accepting professional
responsibility for the results and accuracy of its audits, espe-
cially in regard to inventory [Previts and Merino, 1998, p. 290].
When the profession pointed out that an audit statement made
clear the audit’s limitations in regard to the detection of fraud
and understatement of assets, critics questioned the purpose of
an audit. The establishment of a federal bureau of auditors
which would be certified by the federal government was even
suggested [Previts and Merino, 1998, pp. 291-293].
In response to the criticism and threats, the American Insti-
tute of Accountants (AIA), established a committee headed by
Samuel Broad to address the issue. In doing this, Previts and
Merino [1998, p. 293] write: “the minutes of the AIA show that
the institute’s major objective was to establish the autonomy of
the accounting profession over audit standards.” In 1936, in
one of the first examples of the profession’s greater responsibil-
ity for self-regulation, the AIA issued the official release, Exami-
nation of Financial Statements. Unlike the 1917, 1918, and 1929
bulletins issued through the Federal Reserve Board, this report
30Required registrants were those subject to the Securities Act of 1933,
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 [Hills 1957, p. 52].
33
Normand and Wooton: Recognition and valuation of current assets on the balance sheet in the United States, 1865-1940
Published by eGrove, 2001
Accounting Historians Journal, December 200196
was published by the AIA with the Federal Reserve Board “ac-
knowledging that the latest bulletin . . . superseded the 1929
edition” [Carey, 1969, p. 205].
As in the previous bulletins, the 1936 statement included a
model balance sheet, and although the changes were small,
there were differences in the treatment of current assets be-
tween the models. The valuation basis for inventory was now
listed directly on the balance sheet as was the basis for market-
able securities. Previously, the valuation bases were not pre-
sented for either asset. The “Reserve for bad debts” became the
“Reserve for doubtful notes and accounts,” while “Goods in
process” became “Work in process.” Additionally, notes receiv-
able now followed accounts receivable in the order of liquidity
[McLaren, 1947, p. 28].
As with the Federal Reserve Pamphlets of 1917 and 1927,
the AIA 1936 Model Balance Sheet included prepaid expenses
in the Deferred Charges category. Graham and Meredith [1937,
p. 25] explained the basis of exiling prepaid items to the long-
term category: “The item Prepaid Expenses is of little impor-
tance in analysing [sic] the balance sheet, except that it gives
some information as to how the company’s business is con-
ducted.”31  The AIA’s 1936 model current asset section is pre-
sented in Exhibit 6.
By the late 1930s, most accounting texts’ illustrations were
similar to the AIA model balance sheet. No longer was the re-
serve for bad debts listed with the liabilities and inventories
were normally valued at the lower of cost or market. Account-
ing textbooks, thus, followed the lead of the judiciary and en-
acted legislation in their discussions of the valuation and pre-
sentation of this financial statement component.
31It was not until 1947 that the AIA in Accounting Research Bulletin No. 30
recommended that prepaid expenses be included in the current asset section
[Vangermeersch, 1979, p. 3]. ARB No. 30 contained another major change in
that it changed the basic definition of current assets/liabilities. Previously, one
year often was used as a primary determinant whether or not an asset was a
current asset. In 1944, in The Journal of Accountancy, Anson Herrick set forth
the argument that the operating cycle of a business should be used in this
determination - not simply an arbitrary period of one year. Herrick [1944, pp.
48-49] writes: “working assets are available cash and those which are made to
appear and disappear by the operations of the ‘operating cycle’.” Herrick then
basically defined the operating cycle as the time in which merchandise is
purchased and sold, cash to cash. As a member of the Committee on Account-
ing Practice saw his idea prevail in the committee’s unanimous vote for the
“now classic ‘one year or the normal operating cycle, whichever is greater’
rule” [Vangermeersch, 1996, p. 388].
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EXHIBIT 6
American Institute of Accountants
Examination of Financial Statements
Current Assets, 1936 Form of Balance Sheet
Cash in banks and on hand
Marketable securities (state basis)
Notes and accounts receivable:
Customers:
Accounts receivable
Notes receivable
Others
Less:
Reserve for doubtful notes and accounts
Reserve for discounts, freight, allowances, etc.
Inventories (state basis)
Raw materials and supplies
Work in progress
Finished goods
Other current assets:
Indebtedness of stockholders, directors, officers and
employees (current)
Indebtedness of affiliated companies (current)
Other items (describe)
Total current assets
Also, in the 1930s, the importance of the analysis of finan-
cial statements and the role of ratios in the analysis was seen in
the publications of two classic financial texts Security Analysis
[1934] by Graham and Dodd and The Interpretation of Financial
Statements [1937] by Graham and Meredith. Here, Graham and
Meredith set forth an extensive discussion of what constituted
cash, inventories, current assets, working capital, and the work-
ing capital ratio and what should be considered in evaluating
them — including the importance of “offset-reserves” in deter-
mining the proper valuation of assets. They concluded with a
comprehensive example of “analyzing a balance sheet and in-
come account by the ratio method.”
The influence of the Securities Acts of the 1930s, the new
listing requirements of the NYSE, and the AIA’s model balance
sheet on the evolution of the current asset section perhaps can
best be seen by contrasting balance sheets of the early 1930s
with those at the decade’s end. While some companies’ state-
ments already met the AIA’s 1936 balance sheet recommenda-
tions, other companies had to create new financial statements.
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By 1930, The American Brake Shoe and Foundry Company’s
annual report presented its current assets almost identically to
those on the AIA’s 1936 model balance sheet. The balance sheet
was classified, current assets listed first, current assets were
evaluated, and the valuation basis given.32
For Sears, Roebuck and Co. to meet the 1936 guidelines,
only modest changes were needed. Although Sears, Roebuck’s
balance sheet in 1930 presented much greater detail than most
companies’ statements, the report of 1940 was still more infor-
mative and nearly identical to the AIA model. In 1930, fixed
assets were listed first on the balance sheet. However, in 1940,
current assets were first. In the 1930 report, by contrast to
inventories which were reported at LCM, marketable securities
were listed but no method of valuation was given. In 1940, both
cost and market for marketable securities were presented. In
1930, Sears presented accounts receivables with no offset for
bad debts and used a general reserve. Ten years later, accounts
and notes receivable were sub-classified (customers, employees,
other) and a direct offset (reserve for collection and doubtful
accounts) was employed.
Although, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, General Elec-
tric Company was a leader in the development of a detailed
balance sheet, its balance sheet evolution had not progressed as
far as American Brake Shoe or Sears. On GE’s 1930 balance
sheet, there was no stated valuation of either inventory or
notes/accounts receivable; only a general reserve was shown. In
1930, marketable securities were listed but whether a cost or
market valuation was used was not disclosed. In GE’s 1940
report, marketable securities were reported at the lower of par
or market with both values given. Inventories were reported at
the lower or cost or market (less reserves) although whether
cost or market was used was not stated. Accounts and notes
receivable were reported net of reserves. However, in contrast
to most companies, the reserve was not a direct offset to receiv-
ables but it was reported in the general (miscellaneous) reserves
in the liability section.
32International Business Machines was another company whose 1930 cur-
rent asset section of its annual report met the recommendations of the 1936
model. IBM’s balance sheet listed current assets first, evaluated current assets,
and reported the valuation basis. The only noticeable difference between IBM’s
1930 and 1940 current asset sections were inventories were reported “at cost or
lower” in 1930 and “lower of cost or market” in 1940.
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Unlike American Brake Shoe and Foundry, Sears Roebuck,
and General Electric, there were companies like American Can
Company that, between 1930 and 1940, developed an entire set
of financial statements. For example, in American Can’s annual
report, 1930 its “Profit Statement” consisted of four lines start-
ing with “Net earnings for 12 Months” (with no explanation of
how this amount was derived) less “amount written off for de-
preciation” less “reserve for federal taxes” equals “balance”
($22,883,940.63). In 1930, with nearly $200 million in assets,
American Can presented a six line non-classified asset section.
By 1935, although its “Consolidated Income Amount” State-
ment still consisted of four lines, American Can’s “Consolidated
Sheet” (balance sheet) was now classified and presented some
detail on current assets. Although valuations for neither inven-
tories nor receivables were presented, in the President’s Letter,
the valuation method was reported. And, unlike 1930, “Market-
able Securities” were reported at both cost and market in 1935.
Although still rather brief when compared to many compa-
nies’ reports, by 1940, American Can’s balance sheet met the
general guidelines of the 1936 AIA model for current assets.
Current assets were listed first. In a note at the bottom of the
balance sheet, American Can stated the basis or the value of its
inventory.33  Receivables were divided into “accounts and bills
receivables” and “deferred accounts and bills receivable” with
the latter reduced by an allowance account.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Brief [1987, p. 155] writes that the development of financial
reports and disclosure in the U.S. was a “period of experimenta-
tion and innovation” for, during most of the period, few au-
thoritative standards existed to guide the construction and pre-
sentation of the financial data. The development of the balance
sheet and the resulting classification of current assets was,
therefore, the response of various entities to a changing busi-
ness environment. In their discussion of why the American and
British balance sheet differed, Littleton and Zimmerman [1962,
p. 92] wrote: “In America as in England, the accounting action
33The note to American Can’s balance sheet [1940, np] stated: “As hereto-
fore, a fixed quantity of tin plate (approximately one-half of our average inven-
tory in flat stock) is carried at a constant price which is substantially lower
than present market price; the remainder of the inventory is valued at the
lower of cost or market.”
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taken came in response to local conditions; different conditions
demanded different solutions.”
In contrast to America, by 1870 through the Companies
Act, 1862 and the Regulation of Railways Acts, 1868, the basic
concept of the British balance sheet had been established: “a
horizontal division was made in the British balance sheet . . .
the upper portion reported share capital and mortgage debt on
the left, permanent assets and ‘balance down’ on the right”
[Littleton and Zimmerman, 1962, pp. 81-85]. This was a logical
presentation, since “British balance sheets were designed to
publicize both the stewardship of the initial use of the share-
holders’ investments and the stewardship of the company offic-
ers in maintaining capital while seeking profits” [Littleton and
Zimmerman,1962, p. 92].
By contrast, in 1870, the purpose, form, and order of the
American balance sheet was not settled — the balance sheet
was a fluid document. In fact, at this time, many businesses did
not issue annual reports. While corporations such as transpor-
tation companies, banks or insurance companies were often
required by state charters to issue annual reports, these reports
did not always include financial statements. If financial state-
ments were included, they were often of a minimal nature.
In truth, there was little reason for companies to do other-
wise. There were no authoritative guidelines to follow, no Fed-
eral Reserve Board, no SEC, few demands by banks, no re-
quests by security analysis, no CPAs to audit the statements, no
editorials demanding more informative statements, and few
shareholders to satisfy. As Littleton and Zimmerman [1962, p.
92] point out: “American business did not at that time draw
significant amounts of capital from the public sale of securities;
there was as yet no history of large issues of stock or of exten-
sive investor losses from stock speculation.” Therefore, unlike
the situation in Britain, the concept of stewardship did not
dominate the preparation of the few statements they were being
issued.
Thus, while the balance sheet concept was still quite fluid,
a significant change occurred in credit policy. As has been dis-
cussed, during and immediately following the Civil War, trade
credit became less important and bank credit became more
important. Instead of discounting two-name notes which car-
ried with them a certain degree of security, banks often issued
single-name notes. With single-name notes came more risk and
banks began to review their credit procedures. Although they
often had personal knowledge of the business seeking credit,
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banks began to make more use of mercantile credit agency re-
ports in their decisions. Moreover, banks began to require more
financial statements, especially balance (property) sheets from
customers. As most debts were short term, banks placed special
emphasis on the ability of a business to repay a loan. Instead of
looking at solvency (the ability to repay over the life of a busi-
ness), banks concentrated on liquidity (the ability to repay im-
mediately or in the short run — working capital).
One problem that banks faced was traditional balance
sheets did not readily provide liquidity information. At this
time, most balance sheets were not classified by assets and if
they were, long-life assets were normally listed first. Thus,
banks developed their own balance sheet forms for customers
to complete on which assets were listed in the order of liquid-
ity. Similarly, because banks were concerned with the repay-
ment of short-term debts, credit agencies and merchandising
firms placed great emphasis on the balance sheet and especially
the liquidity of the assets.
Because of this trend, by the time the great American cor-
porations emerged and a corresponding increase in sharehold-
ers occurred, the general format of the balance sheet had been
established. The credit aspects of business still determined the
financial reporting practices. Littleton and Zimmerman [1962,
pp. 92-93], write: “Circulation of financial statements to share-
holders would not be necessary; because of the nature of the
loan, the working capital position of the debtor was of greatest
interest to these banks . . . the party most interested in seeing
the balance sheet was the lender; his chief concern was logically
the borrower’s ability to repay a short-term loan.”
The banker’s balance sheet (assets on the left and in the
order of liquidity) gained credence with the 1917 issuance of
the “Uniform Accounting” statement by the Federal Reserve
Board. Although the model balance sheet in the statement was
not required, it provided guidelines for companies to follow at a
time when few guidelines were available. Yet, at this time, some
companies still did not issue classified balance sheets and many
listed plant assets first. The usefulness of the availability of
such classifications was shown by the increase in the number
and importance of security analysis.34
34In 1919, Alexander Wall, Secretary-Treasury of the Robert Morris Associ-
ates set forth a systematic method of analysis and followed that with analysis
studies based upon the comparison of companies within industries [Brown,
1955, pp. 14-15].
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In 1929, the Federal Reserve System issued the Verification
of Financial Statements, a revision of its 1917 balance sheet
audit guidelines and, like its predecessor, included a model bal-
ance sheet. As before, the model was only by way of a guideline
and it was not always followed. Its similarity in format, how-
ever, reinforced the concept of listing items in the order of
liquidity. Moreover, although the 1917 and 1929 reports were
largely directed at banks, other business often looked upon the
model balance sheets as basic guidelines for their own state-
ments [Huizingh, 1967, p. 69].
With the collapse of the securities market and the revela-
tion of improper financial reporting, financial reporting under-
went an extensive investigation and ultimately a permanent
change. The Securities Act of 1933 conferred upon the FTC the
authority to prescribe accounting methods for companies. The
1934 Securities and Exchange Act transferred the authority to
prescribe accounting methods to the newly established SEC
and required that financial statements filed with the SEC be
certified by an independent public accountant. Additionally, the
1933 Act required the inclusion of a balance sheet and profit
and loss data “in such form as the Commission shall prescribe”
while the 1934 act gave the SEC “broad authority to prescribe
the form and content of financial statements” [Hills, 1957, p.
52].
In 1936, the AIA issued its Examination of Financial State-
ments. This report, which superseded the 1929 bulletin issued
by the Federal Reserve Board, was the accounting profession’s
first major step toward self regulation and a commitment to
more uniform financial statements. As in previous bulletins, the
statement included a model balance sheet. Although this was
similar in many ways to previous statements, it placed greater
emphasis upon the proper valuation of current assets on the
balance sheet.
Although comprehensive guidelines for the presentation
and valuation of current assets were put forth in 1917 and 1927,
these guidelines often were ignored. Only after the 1933-34 se-
curities acts and the issuance of the AIA’s model current asset
section in 1936 did companies have the liability incentive and
the authoritative guidelines available to disclose and appropri-
ately value current assets on the balance sheet.35  Although
35Although railroads were leaders in their acceptance of the classified bal-
ance sheet, it was the 1950s before many railroads discontinued the practice of
listing current assets after plant assets and investments on the balance sheet.
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current assets have been reexamined and redefined several
times since the 1936 model was presented, the overall format of
today’s current asset section is still quite similar to that of 1936.
Accounting historians might continue the exploration begun in
this paper by contrasting the historical development of that
model with the historical development of the presentation and
valuation of current assets in countries such as Britain or
France in which government regulation of companies and
authoritative reporting standards developed much earlier.
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